Business as a Source of Recruitment of Members of The Russian Federal Government in 2000–2021

  • Denis Tev The Sociological Institute of the RAS — Branch of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Saint Petersburg, Russia
Keywords: government, ministers, business, career, recruitment, elite

Abstract

The article presents the analysis of the role of business as a source of recruitment of the Russian federal government elite in 2000–2021. The empirical basis of the study is a biographical database, which includes information about the career paths of 136 people who were members of the government. The study revealed that business is the most significant supplier of cabinet members outside the administrative sphere. Most members of the government had post-Soviet experience in commercial organizations (usually in key positions), but most often indirect: business positions rarely serve as a direct springboard to ministerial posts. The share of people who came from business depends on the type of government position (most of them are among economic ministers) and varies over time (there are especially many in the cabinet of Mishustin). As for the type of business, a significant proportion of government members worked in the largest firms. Private sector employment is the most widespread, but the public sector being the main direct supplier of cabinet members from business. The practice of recruitment of ministers from branches that are subordinate to the respective ministries is widespread. The article discusses in detail the various factors in the recruitment of businessmen for government positions. Among them are the form of government and political regime, peculiarities of the legal status of members of the government, structural and instrumental power of business, dependence of the state on business in terms of managerial and technical competence, the presence of a large public sector in the economy and the “crony” nature of capitalism.

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Published
2022-11-15
How to Cite
Tev, D. (2022). Business as a Source of Recruitment of Members of The Russian Federal Government in 2000–2021. ZHURNAL SOTSIOLOGII I SOTSIALNOY ANTROPOLOGII (The Journal of Sociology and Social Anthropology), 25(4), 46-78. https://doi.org/10.31119/jssa.2022.25.4.3