Высокопоставленные чиновники Администрации Президента РФ: каналы рекрутирования и карьера

  • Денис Тев Социологический институт Федерального центра теоретической и прикладной социологии Российской академии наук, Санкт-Петербург, Россия


The article analyzes the career of senior officials of the presidential administration. The empirical basis of the study is a database that includes biographical profiles of 354 PA officials in 1991–2018. The main channels have been identified, within which the professional path passes before being appointed to a key position in the PA and after leaving it. The most important source of recruitment of presidential officials and their place of work after retirement are administrative bodies, primarily at the federal level, and, in this sense, administrative professionalization is the predominant tendency of their career. In particular, positions in the Russian government and the PA often serve as a springboard for each other, which contributes to the integration of the government elite and the presidential bureaucracy into a single power elite. In the PA offshoots from force-structures are quite widely represented; moreover, the movement of personnel is two-way. The level of PA militarization was historically variable, starting to grow in the second term of Yeltsin's presidency and reaching a maximum under Putin and Medvedev. Compared to the administration, representative bodies, especially the federal parliament, are much less important as a channel for recruiting presidential officials and their place of work after resignation. Business — a significant, although mostly indirect supplier of PA leaders, and its plutocratization has a tendency to increase. A more significant role is played by business as the place of work of retired AP officials, many of whom were employed in major firms, creating dynamic interlocking of administrative and economic elites. Also among the officials of the PA some experience gained in the media and in the scientific and educational field.


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Как цитировать
Тев, Д. (2020). Высокопоставленные чиновники Администрации Президента РФ: каналы рекрутирования и карьера. ЖУРНАЛ СОЦИОЛОГИИ И СОЦИАЛЬНОЙ АНТРОПОЛОГИИ, 23(3), 153-187. извлечено от http://jourssa.ru/jourssa/article/view/2296
Политическая социология